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A call to resist illegitimate authority

October 1984

The Nicaraguan Election and the
Problem of Democracy
FRANK BRODHEAD

Wm

the Nicaraguan election be a
"free election"? In this Orwellian year
much of our political life is inevitably
dominated by the struggle to call things
by their true names. Thus we have
missiles that are ''peacekeepers'' and
an economic "recovery" that has
brought destitution to millions. In
Orwell's Ministry of Truth we see our
own Great Communicator.
One casualty of the Orwellian onslaught has been free elections. In
many instances - especially in U.S.
client states - "free elections" are
best understood as a form of theater.
Featuring ''the threat of rebel disruption," a spate of free elections has held
our media spellbound, staggered that
such marvelous and courageous displays of democracy could be staged under such adverse conditions. El Salvador has had two such successes in only
two years; and well-received productions have been staged by the theater
companies of Turkey, the Philippines,
and Guatemala. President Reagan
hopes that his new Grenadean troupe
will be able to perform a free-election
drama in time to aid his own reelection efforts this November.
While these performances differ in
certain ways, each of the current wave
of free-election dramas is concerned to
demonstrate to skeptical audiences that
democracy is alive and well in the host

country. In many cases, such as the
1982 election in El Salvador, this
demonstration function was its
primary purpose, and was even more
important than the selection of one
candidate over another. For this reason
the Salvadoran election and others of
the same type may be called demonstration elections. 1
It is obvious that the governments of
Turkey, El Salvador, or the Philippines
do not need to stage an election drama
in order to inform their own citizens
about the state of democracy in their
country. They know this only too well.
Rather, the audience targeted by a
demonstration election is the U.S.
media and "informed opinion," and
through them the U.S. public. The purpose of the election drama is to ensure
that U.S. public opinion will continue
to acquiesce in keeping the military aid
pipeline open, silencing critics who
would cut off such aid or make it contingent on improvements in human
rights. Because of the deep devotion of
our leaders to democracy, and thus
free elections, U .S.-sponsored military
dictatorships must stage free election
dramas from time to time in return for
our advisers and helicopters. They
must sing for their supper.
The Nicaraguan Election
Is the Nicaraguan election also a
"demonstration election"? Clearly it
has some demonstration qualities.
That this is so reflects in part the success of the Reagan administration's

destabilization efforts against
Nicaragua. The counterpart of
U.S.-supported terrorism and sabotage
against Nicaragua has been an aggressive PR campaign to show that
Nicaragua's Sandinista government is
repressive and fast becoming
Continued on Page Three

Dumping Reagan
' 'Now

after a decade of near
isolationism when even the hint of
military action brought denunciations
of 'planning for another Vietnam' we
can realistically think about the use of
force again."
These are the recent words of Pentagon systems analyst Mark Cancian.
However, judging from its actions, it is
clear that the Reagan administration is
not only thinking about the use of
force, but is carefully and methodically
planning a major military intervention
in Central America.
A study by Theodore Moran, Director of Georgetown University's International Diplomacy and Trade Program, recommends a five-year plan for
military action in Nicaragua that
would include an invasion, bombings,
occupations and pacification. According to Moran, 61,000 soldiers, 216
planes, 734 helicopters, tanks and
other material would be employed at a
cost of over $10 billion. It is estimated
that 4,780 U.S . troops would be killed
and 18,600 wounded. David MacMichael, a former CIA agent in Central America who recently left the
agency, has stated that the Regan administration will try to stage a situation
in the region in an attempt to win over
public opinion for ari invasion. Sandinista leaders have warned that one
option the U.S. has considered is to
assassinate one or more members of
the FSLN National Directorate and
thus, justify an invasion similar to the
one in Grenada last October.
The people of Nicaragua have taken
these threats very seriously and believe
that a U.S. invasion is inevitable if
Reagan is re-elected. In Nicaragua,
every neighborhood (except for a few
upper-middle class areas) is organized
and armed on a block-by-block level.
Similarly, Cuba has recently stated that
a U.S. naval blockade and/or invasion
of the island is a possibility in the near
future if Reagan is elected. Neighborhood militias have been mobilized
there as well.
The readers of this newsletter do not
need to be reminded of all the effects
of Reagan 's policies or the consequences of another four years with him
in the White House. In the simplest
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terms, a Reagan victory on Nov. 6 will
mean increased and unnecessary suffering, death, destruction and repression on a massive scale both at home
and in the Third World. Accordingly,
an all-out effort must be made to dump
Reagan.
Between now and November 6,
Dump-Reagan coalitions that include
everyone from Marxist-Leninists . to
moderate Democrats will be working
to register voters, raise important issues
and mobilize people through marches,
door-to-door canvassing, and public
forums. It is essential that the urgency
of the current situation be felt and
acted on. Although the immediate goal
is to defeat Reagan, all electoral work
must be put in the context of building a
broad-based radical movement that
will continue to fight both Republicans
and Democrats, become powerful
enough to stop the geared-up war
machine, and create a just society at
home.

Correction: In the July/ August issue
of the Resist Newsletter we announced
that Resist had new board members,
one of whom is Rene Valle. The announcement read that Rene has traveled throughout the U.S. creating a link
between the FDR/FMLN, Salvadorans
living in the U.S., and the solidarity
movement. This is incorrect. A corrected version reads: Rene is a
Salvadoran activist who is currently a
staff person at Casa El SalvadorFarabundo Marti in Cambridge Massachusetts. He has traveled throughout
the U.S. creating a link between the
people of El Salvador and the people
of the United States.
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The Nicaraguan Election
''totalitarian.'' The purpose of this
propaganda campaign is to undercut
U.S. opponents of continued congressional support for the "covert" war,
and to persuade the leaders of our
allies in Europe to reduce aid and trade
with Nicaragua, forcing Nicaragua into further dependency on the Soviet
bloc. Thus Nicaragua's election has
some demonstration qualities in that it
is being held earlier than originally
scheduled in order to maintain international support.
What kind of election will this be?
Will it be a genuinely free election or,
as Secretary of State George Shultz put
it, will it be "a sham, Soviet-style"
election?
Earlier this year Secretary of State
Shultz ably outlined some of the
characteristics of a free election. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 22, 1984,
Shultz maintained that for elections to
be democratic ''rival political groups''
must be allowed "to form themselves
and have access to people, to have the
right of assembly, to have access to the
media.' Earlier, speaking in response
to Nicaragua's announcement of elections, Shultz said that "the important
thing is that if there is to be an electoral
process, it be observed not only at the
moment when people vote, but in all
the preliminary aspects that make an
election really mean something" (New
York Times, February 6, 1984).
Nothing could be more true. A genuinely free election is not only a matter
of uncoerced balloting, but also requires an open electoral campaign.
More broadly, a democratic election
presupposes that for a substantial period prior to the election the nation's
political lifeblood flows strongly and
that citizens actively participate in organizations of their own choosing to
debate (and act on) their ideas about
how they want to govern themselves.
Nor can a free election be ensured by
jetting in various famous people as
"observers," who arrive a few days before the election, see no one beaten in
front of them and observe no ballotbox stuffing, and then return home to
give the election a clear bill of health.
As Shultz observed, it is not the
moment of balloting, but "all the preliminary aspects that make an election
really mean something."
Nevertheless, despite their profoundity, Shultz's observations raise
several issues. The first is their source.

#169

It is the height of hypocrisy for an architect of the U.S. war against
Nicaragua - illegal by our own standards and according to International
law - to measure Nicaraguan democracy according to his own criteria.
Nor should the Conqueror of Grenada
be allowed to speak unchallenged
about self-determination.
Second, it must be recalled that
Shultz was making his comments about
free elections just weeks prior to the
U .S.-sponsored election in El Salvador. While Shultz did not address the
applicability of his views to the
Salvadorian election, we can do it for
him.
Both El Salvador and Nicaragua are
governed under a State of Siege which
severely abridges rights of speech,
assembly, and the press. The State of
Siege in El Salvador was imposed in
March 1980, simultaneously with the
U.S.-designed land reform program.
The State of Siege in Nicaragua was
begun in 1982 after the contra attacks
began. In Nicaragua an opposition
press exists, though it is censored; but
censorship is to be lifted for the election campaign, parties contesting the
election will be allowed time on government-owned radio and TV, and
they will receive an electoral subsidy to
finance their campaigns. In El Salvador the independent or opposition
press was destroyed by 1981, through
terror and assassination. The elections
in El Salvador were carried out in a
climate of terror, as 40,000 citizens had
been murdered by Death Squads connected to the government and the
military, and as General Garcia - the
head of the Army - had just announced that not to vote was
"treason." No such terror exists in
Nicaragua except that created by the
contras. Even the Nicaraguan Human
Rights Commission, an opponent of
the Sandinista government, claims for
1983 only 1,000 arrests, 209 disappearances, and 15 killings (Manchester
Guardian Weekly, May 27, 1984).
Thus the most elementary examination of the ''preliminary aspects that
make an election really mean something'' indicate that the Nicaraguan
election will be far more free than the
Salvadoran elections of 1982 and 1984.
Why does much of the U.S. public
think the opposite? This introduces the
role of the media in making demonstration elections possible, and we mav

suggest the following Law of Media
Coverage:

Whenever a demonstration election occurs within the U.S. sphere of influence, the absence of all the necessary preconditions for a democratic
election - free speech, the right to
organize, the right not to vote, etc. are strictly off the agenda of the U.S.
media. Whenever a critical election occurs outside the U.S. sphere and in the
enemy camp, the alleged absence of
these preconditions are featured by our
media to the exclusion of all else.
Thus in the Polish local elections of
June 1984, for example, the U.S.
media correctly emphasized the complete absence of the most elementary
democratic rights, and paid no attention to the fact that election-day events
went smoothly or that no one was
visibly coerced to vote. On the contrary, U.S. television networks gave
prominent coverage to spokesmen
from the remnants of Solidarity as they
explained the ways in which the election was a fraud. (It goes without saying that no Salvadoran guerrillas were
given the opportunity to explain to a
U.S. television audience the ways in
which the Salvadoran election was not
truly democratic.)
A corollary to the Law of Media
Coverage concerns the mechanics of
the election and the election-day
events. In a U .S.-sponsored demonstration election, such as the Salvadoran election, the U.S. media focuses on
the mechanics of voting - whether
everyone has a ballot, is the voter
registration list complete, etc. - while
such issues are of little interest to the
U.S. media in an "enemy" election
such as the one in Poland. This is particularly true for the question of voter
turnout. In a U.S.-supported
demonstration election, a high voter
turnout indicates that the choices offered to the voters are popular, and
that the government offering these
choices is supported by the people. At
the same time, a high voter turnout is a
rejection for the guerrillas, who have
denounced the election and are pictured as trying to disrupt it. But in an
election outside the U.S. sphere, a high
voter turnout is a sign of government
coercsion and fraud.
These observations are confirmed by
a systematic tabulation of New York
Times coverage of the Nicaraguan and

Continued on Page Four
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The Nicaraguan Election
Salvadoran elections made by Edward
S. Herman in early 1984. According to
his count, between February 1 and
March 30, 1984, the Times ran 28 news
articles on the Salvadoran election and
eight on the Nicaraguan election.
(Recall that this was the period leading
up to the Salvadoran election, while
that in Nicaragua was still eight
months away.) Herman found that
80% of the articles on the Salvadoran
election depended for their sources on
U.S. or Salvadoran officials, while only 1% of the sources quoted were
peasants and 10% were rebels. Not surprisingly, the articles overwhelmingly
reflected those themes compatible with
the demonstration intent of the election, stressing the threat of rebel
disruption, the mechanics of the election and official hopes for the election.
In accord with our Law of Media
Coverage, the following topics were
not mentioned: freedom of the press,
freedom to organize, the possibility
that
not voting might be
dangerous, fraud in the 1982 election,
or any limits on the ability of candidates to qualify and campaign. Issues
mentioned in only one of the 28 articles
included the existence of the state of
siege and the fact that the ballot boxes
were transparent. In covering the
Nicaraguan election, however, the
Times relied first on U.S. officials,
secondly on the Nicaraguan opposition, and last on Nicaraguan government officials. Not surprisingly,
there was no mention of the threat of
rebel disruption; instead the articles
stressed limits on the freedom of the
press and the right to organize, qualify,
and campaign for office. 2
Thus the most sketchy analysis suffices to show that the Reagan administration's concern about
democracy and elections in Nicaragua
are part of a propaganda system, and
we may safely predict that the U.S.
media will be guided by this propaganda system in its coverage of the
Nicaraguan elections, employing the
Law of Media Coverage and its corollaries on election-day events and
voter turnout.

foreign intervention or externally sponsored civil war. Though we do not have
room here to do more than suggest a
few themes, it is useful to recall that
the French, Russian, and Cuban
revolutions had some of the following
similarities:
• A popular revolution swept away
an old order that was oppressive,
regressive, and corrupt;
• the work of the revolution itself
was carried out by a popular movement, not simply a tiny vanguard;
and that in the days following the
overthrow of the government a
great burst of popular enthusiasm
ensued, in which masses of people
organized themselves into every
conceivable kind of organization
with the intention of governing
themselves as directly as possible.
• The mere existence of this revolution was considered a danger by the
revolutionary regimes conservative
neighbors, and they set about to
subvert or overthrow it and restore
the old order.
• The resulting war had two somewhat opposing impacts on the
revolutionary nation: it greatly increased the authoritarian nature of
the new political leadership; and it
required this leadership to arm the
nation and enlist the energies of as
many people as possible in defending and governing the country.
This last point is where Nicaragua is
now at, and it indicates the great

Popular Democracy
It is possible to view Nicaragua's
election in another light, placing it in
the historical context of popular
revolutions which have attempted to
consolodate themselves in the face of

Address _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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responsibility that citizens of the
United States have in the future of
Nicaraguan democracy, for only we
can end the war.
Because of the U.S.-sponsored
counterrevolution against Nicaragua,
the Sandinista revolution is now at a
crossroads where the requirements of
national defense strain at the fabric of
popular democracy. The democracy
envisioned by Nicaragua's base communities and popular movements is
unlikely to survive a long war. It is this
popular democracy which is the real
enemy of the Reagan administration.
If we care about democracy in
Nicaragua we must end the war.
1. This concept is spelled out in
detail in Edward S. Herman and Frank
Brodhead, Demonstration Elections:
U.S. -Staged Elections in the
Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and El
Salvador (South End Press, 1984).
2. Edward S. Herman, "The New
York Times on the 1984 Salvadoran
and Nicaraguan Elections," Covert
Action Information Bulletin, Number
21 (Spring, 1984), pp. 7-13.

Frank Brodhead, a member of the
Resist board, co-authored a book with
Edward. S. Herman entitled:
Demonstration Elections: U .S.-Staged
Elections in the Dominican Republic,
Vietnam, and El Salvador (South End
Press, 1984).

The Resist Pledge System
The most important source of Resist's
income is monthly pledges. Pledges
help us plan ahead by guaranteeing us
a minimum monthly income. In turn,
pledges receive a monthly reminder letter (in addition to the newsletter) which
contains news of recent grants . and
other Resist activities. So take the
plunge and become a Resist pledge!
Yes, I would like to pledge S
monthly to the work of Resist.
Name _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

City _ _ _ State __ Zip, _ _ __
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Election Information
It is not coincidence that the
Nicaraguan elections for choosing a
President, Vice-President and
90-member assembly will be held four
days before the U.S. elections. The
date was moved up so that the election
would legitamize the Nicaraguan
revolution internationally, thus
creating another obstacle for Reagan
to justify a direct military intervention
if he is re-elected. Already several
groups and nations have expressed support for the elections in Nicaragua. A
statement in August by Nobel Prize
winners Linus Pauling, Adolfo
Esquivel, George Wald and Betty
Williams stated: "Nicaragua is making
all efforts possible to hold free, open
and honest elections." According to
Nicaraguan newspapers and press releases, the following nations have expressed support for the Nicaraguan
elections: Brazil, Argentina,
Venezuela, Australia, Columbia,
Bolivia, Panama, Ecuador, Spain,
Sweden, France, the Eastern-bloc
countries and the Socialist International.
The electoral process in Nicaragua
began in late July when over 1.5
million out of approximately 1.6
million eligible voters complied with
the law and registered to vote. (Unlike
in El Salvador, the law does not require
citizens to vote - only to register to
vote.) During the registration campaign the election boards were attacked
by U.S.-backed contras, eight compesinos were murdered and four electoral officials were wounded.
The FSLN and six other parties
registered their candidates while a
coalition of four other parties including the Social Democrats, Social
Christians, Liberal Constitutionalists
and Conservative parties called the
Democratic Coordinating Committee
(DCC) refused to participate until the
other parties accepted their list of
demands. One of the demands was that
all the parties in Nicaragua have a "national dialogue'' which would include
counter-revolutionary leaders based in
Honduras and Costa Rica who had expressed support for Arturo Cruz, the
leader of the DCC. A few days before
the deadline for parties to register Cruz
returned to Nicaragua after confering
with State Department officials in the
U.S. After considerable fanfare and international media coverage, the four
right-wing parties continued to press
#169

for their demand of a "national
dialogue" that would include the contras. The FSLN and the six other
registered parties refused to talk with
the contras and the parties of the DCC
lost their status as political parties by
missing an extended deadline to
register for the elections.
In Nicaragua, the popular view of
Arturo Cruz and the DCC is that they
are stooges of the CIA. Even the
Washington Post has described the
committee as very poorly organized
and incapable of serving as a political
alternative in Nicaragua. The Post also
speculated that the four right-wing parties never truly considered participating in the elections because they are
counting on the CIA's "secret" war to
allow them to take power.
The six parties other than the FSLN
participating in the elections are:
The Conservative Democratic Party This party split off from the conservative Party in 1956. With the motto
"God, Order and Justice", its 23 point
platform includes an economic policy
that calls for a ''social pact'' between
public and private sectors so that
"private enterprise can operate without fear.'' The party says it will try to
convince the private sector to share its
wealth with workers and thus, prevent
worker exploitation.
Marxist-Leninist Popular Action
Movement - The party was founded
in 1972 by revolutionary students. The
Workers' Front is its union organization and during the struggle against
Somoza the Anti-Somoza Popular
Militia was its armed wing. Their program advocates doing away with
capitalist production relation by force.
It opposes the mixed economy of the
Sandinistas, considering it to be a
social pact that primarily benefits big
business. The party characterizes the
current Sandinista process as
bourgeoise.
Socialist Party - This party was
founded in 1944 and was illegal during
its first 35 years under Somoza. It is a
member party of the Patriotic Revolutionary Front along with the Popular
Social Christians and the FSLN. It
calls for national economic planning in
accordance with existing economic and
human needs resources. It calls for
''ridding the state administration of
bureacracy and strengthening a foreign
policy of peace independence and nonalignment and developing and deepenResist Newsletter

ing of popular, democratic and revolutionary unity."
Communist Party - This party grew
out of a split with the Nicaraguan
Socialist Party in 1967. The platform
seeks establishment of a democratic,
patriotic government led by communists whose basic function would be
to create conditions for the construction of socialism as the path towards
communism. It favors radical agrarian
reform and restructuring the economy,
trade relations and financial policies
and rejects the obligation to pay
foreign debts inherited from Somoza.
Popular Social Christian Party - This
party, which is also a member of the
Patriotic Revolutionary Front emerged
in 1976 as a splinter group from the
Social Christian Party and proposes a
mixed economy with a non-aligned
foreign policy. They advocate easing
relations between church and state and
replacing the Sandinista Defense Committees with neighborhood councils.
Independent Liberal Party -This party was formed in 1946 and considers
itself a third way for Nicaragua "between the conservative parties that seek
a return to the past and the left-wing
parties that are totalitarian and sectarian.''
, Presently, the campaigns of the
seven parties are in full gear. Because
of contra attacks a state of emergency
has existed in Nicaragua since 1982 but
for the election period civil liberties
have been broadened, censorship has
been lifted (except for military information), the right to hold public
meetings and distribute political propaganda has been restored. Considerable state financing is available to
all parties as is a proportion of time on
state-owned radio and TV. Dozens of
nations will be on hand to observe the
elections and Nicaragua has invited 20
U.S. Congresspeople (10 Republicans
and 10 Democrats) to observe the process.
While Reagan will do everything in
his power to delegitimize the election in
Nicaragua, two things are sure to happen: the election will receive broad international recognition and the FSLN
and Daniel Ortega will win a greater
percentage of the eligible electorate in
Nicaragua than Reagan will win in the
U.S.
Ken Tangvik
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The Jackson Campaign in
the South
ANNE BRADEN

It

was August, at a rally in Newburg,

Ky., just outside Louisville, where I

live. Adlene Abstain, a Black woman
long involved in civil-rights activity,
was campaigning for the state legislature, her first try for public office.
"This is what Jesse Jackson's campaign was all about,'' Louisville grassroots Black leader Mattie Jones told
the gathering. "He said the same key
we used to vote for him unlocks the
legislature, the U.S. Senate door. We'll
keep winning in Kentucky.''
The crowd - mostly Black, but including a few equally enthusiastic
whites - cheered.
Then Bill Allison, progressive white
lawyer, Kentucky field organizer in the
Jackson campaign, spoke. He said:
"Many of us whites are learning that
when Blacks gain, we gain; when
Blacks win, we win.'' The crowd
cheered again.
Multiply that scene many times - in
some places, perhaps minus the white
participation - and you get a picture
of the South today, in the wake of
Jesse Jackson's historic run for the
presidency.
The Jackson campaign swept
through the South like a tornado,
brought almost a million voters out to
the primaries and caucuses, stimulated
scores of Blacks to run for local office,
injected life-and-death domestic and
international issues into grass-roots
political discussion, and launched a
new people's movement. There has
been nothing like it since the 1960's or, perhaps more accurately, since
Reconstruction over 100 years ago.
The 1960's movements were protests;
this, like the post-Civil-War revolution, is bid for power. It is a movement that calls for totally new directions for government, nationally and
locally, for a humane society where
people come first and foreign policies
based on respect for all the world's
people.
"This was not just an election cam-

a
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paign," says Rev. C.T. Vivian of
Atlanta, Jackson's deputy director for
clergy. "It's a moral and political
movement that will continue, run candidates on platforms that we want, and
hold them responsible."
The national news media never adequately conveyed the strength of Jackson's Southern campaign. Jackson
won 4 states and the District of Columbia in his race for the nomination; all
four of the states he won were in the
South.
Maybe that stunning fact got lost because three were caucus states, in addition to Louisiana, where we won the
primary with 43 percent of the vote. In
caucus states, the "popular vote" is
the number of people who attend firstlevel caucuses where every voter can
participate. Thus, Jackson won in
Virginia with 32 percent of the turnout;
in Mississippi with 45 percent; in South
Carolina, with 25 percent.
He got 25 percent in the North
Carolina and Tennessee primaries, 21
percent in Georgie, 19.6 percent in
Alabama; 7 percent in West Virginia,
with 3 percent Black population. In
other caucus states, he won 35 percent
in Texas; 26 percent in Kentucky (7
percent Black population), and ran just
400 votes behind Mondale in Arkansas.
We won 30 Southern congressional
districts, and we won the cities: Atlanta

Resist News/el/er

(48 percent of the vote); Nashville,
Memphis, Chattanooga in Tennessee;
Durham, Greensboro, Winstom-Salem
in North Carolina; Louisville and Lexington in Kentucky; and many others.
But statistics alone do not convey the
enthusiasm in the South's Black communities. People who had never voted
before came out in mass. They jammed
caucus sites to overflowing. In the legislative district where I live, people began arriving at 8:30 a.m. for a 2 p.m.
caucus, packed the large church basement, and 200 people never got in.
State Rep. Tyronne Brooks, Jackson
chair in Georgia, describes the fervor:
"We had no paid staff and not one
radio or TV ad; we didn't get a cent
from the Washington office until just
before our primary. But we had 500
volunteers in and out of our Atlanta
office everyday, and we raised
$300,000 for the national campaign."
Part of the enthusiasm was simply a
response to a Black man making a
viable campaign for the presidency.
That in itself was a giant step forward
in the long struggle of Blacks for freedom, and suddenly anything seemed
possible. But no one thinks just any
Black candidate could have generated
this enthusiasm. It was also what Jackson was saying. Finally people were
hearing a candidate speaking directly
to their lives and needs.
"You can call it Reverand Jackson's
charisma,'' says Cleveland Sellers,
Jackson southeast regional coordinator. "But that charisma is based on his
historic involvement, his commitment
and, most of all, what he says. He
talked about the issues that affect people's lives - jobs, peace, the military
budget, the locked-out. Some of it was
controversial, but he put it out there in
ways people could relate to. They had
been waiting for this, and suddenly
they had hope."
Scott Douglas, Birmingham community organizer, says the Jackson campaign became a "mass voter education
movement."
''For the first time, average people
on the streets are talking about critical
issues facing the country - what's
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wrong with the economy, foreign
policy," Douglas says. "They are talking about South Africa, the Middle
East, Central America. Not that they
didn't know some of these things before. But Jackson put it all together, he
related the anti-people policies at home
to the anti-people foreign policies.
These are lessons people won't
forget."
As this is written in August, it's too
soon to predict what force this new
movement will have in the November
election, or what future form it will
take. Many Jackson delegates came
home from the Democratic National
Convention disillusioned, because of
the defeat of Jackson's platform
planks and highhanded treatment from
Democratic Party leaders.
Many others, however - and this is
the view I share - maintain that we
really won in San Francisco. We injected a moral dimension into the proceedings. From the most visible national platform we've ever had for progressive politics, we raised the most
crucial issues of our time - the issue of
war and peace in the Jackson platform
planks calling for "no-first-use" and
cuts in military spending; and the issue
of justice at home in the planks on
meaningful affirmative action and enforcement of the Voting Rights Act.
And Jackson spoke for our movement
from the convention podium to an audience of 22 million TV viewers.
If one views the convention as one
more step in building a people's movement that can indeed change the nation's direction, we won. Jackson himself told us to view it this way - and
declared that the Rainbow Coalition
will go on as a permanent force in the
nation's politics. One only had to sense
the energy present at a pre-convention
conference of 350 Jackson leaders
from 40 states in Chicago at the end of
June, and at the delegate meetings in
San Francisco, to know that this movement will not go away.
Of course skeptics down-play Jackson's strength in the South by noting
that Jackson did well because many
white voters stayed home.
''The candidate they are for was not
on the ballot in these primaries," said
one Deep South politician.
There is truth in that, and the
November election may tell that story,
which brings us to the critical question
for those of us who are white. What is
our role in this campaign, and what
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should it be in the future?
First, we must realize that the mass
media gave a totally distorted picture
of Jackson's Rainbow Coalition. Over
and over we heard that the Rainbow
was not working, that Jackson's only
significant support came from Blacks.
That was just not true. The campaign made major inroads into the Hispanic and Asian-American communities, and Native Americans came out in
force.
Certainly, whites were the Rainbow's
weakest stripe. But whites did vote for
Jackson - about 750,000 of them, or
22 percent of his total vote. Whites
worked in the campaign in every
Southern state, in some places in considerable numbers. For example, in
Louisville, about 100 whites were active.
Andrew Kopkind and Alexander
Cockburn wrote recently in The Nation
that the "left" (meaning the white left)
totally rejected the opportunity Jackson's campaign offered. I don't know
who they count as ''left.'' They mentioned the National Organization for
Women. It does important work, but I
never think of it as "left." It's true
that many white women's groups never
grasped the significance of the Jackson
movement and still don't seem to understand that Geraldine Ferraro would
not be on the ticket if Jackson had not
opened up the political process. (Buttons reading, "Ferraro, Thank Jesse
Jackson'' sold like hotcakes on San
Francisco streets.) But I know many
feminists, including NOW members,
who supported Jackson in their communities.
White peace organizations present
another mixed picture. Most national
peace organizations did not endorse
Jackson. Some gave tax-exemption as
the reason, but there were ways they
could have moved despite this. The
more likely reason, especially with the
more conservative single-issue groups,
was that after long deploring the lack
of Blacks in white-led peace actions,
they couldn't recognize a new mass
peace movement when they saw one when it arose form the Black community. That, in part, was what the
Jackson campaign was, a mass new
anti-war movement which Jackson
took into the by-ways of America.
But despite all this, individual
leaders and activists in peace organizations came out for Jackson in community after community. And virtually
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every white leftist I know in the South
supported the campaign.
Our failures as whites in the Jackson
campaign is not that we weren't there
but that we did not reach out adequately to the mass white community.
This campaign offered an unprecedented opportunity to cut away the blinders
imposed by centuries of racism and
show white people that here was a candidate speaking to their deepest needs.
Collectively we failed to take advantage of that historic opportunity. That
is reflected in the low percentage of
white voters for Jackson in most states
- 2 percent in Georgia, 4 percent in
North Carolina, etc. (although more in
the cities, 10 percent in Atlanta, 8 percent in Durham, etc.).
We need to analyze that failure. It
goes back to the syndrome that has always plagued interracial movements:
whites who become involved seem reluctant to share their vision with other
whites. I think there are two reasons
for this.
The first is a temptation to get so
caught up in the excitement of a mass
Black campaign that we stay right there
instead of reaching out to unplowed
fields in the white community. In this
campaign, we consciously combatted
that tendency in Louisville when a few
of us insisted early on that we call
special meetings of white campaign
workers (with the Black leadership) to
plan outreach.
Some white activists argued against
this, and I myself usually don't believe
in separate white meetings. In this case
it was necessary, and it worked. It
forced us to plan approaches to varied
constituencies and organizations, to
make assignments, and do check-up.
We still did not do as much as we
should have, but because of this approach we did involve whites who had
never been active in anti-racist
movements. And on caucus day we
carried one predominantly white
legislative district and had sizeable
white turnouts in others.
The other factor inhibiting adequate
white outreach is a lack of faith that we
can convince other white people to take
an anti-racist path. Unconsciously, we
are saying that we are smarter than
everybody else, we can see these things,
but other whites can't.
The fact is that masses of white people are able to understand that a Black
candidate represents their best interests
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The Jackson Campaign
- if someone will just go to them and
talk straight talk. Reverend Jackson
himself said that wherever he could
speak directly to poor and working
white people he got votes. That happened with white farmers in Missouri,
white miners in West Virginia, unemployed steelworkers in Pennsylvania,
poor white people in Tennessee.
Jackson campaign workers found
the same thing wherever they reached
out beyond their own friends. To do
this, you've got to go door-to-door, to
get directly to people who won't come,
initially, to your rallies. I know of very
few places in the South where door-todoor work in white communities happened in this campaign. Where it did, it
worked. For example, David Martin, a
white community activist with a union
background in Winston-Salem, knocked on 300 doors in his white middleincome working-class neighborhood.
'' About one-third of the people were
hostile," he said, "the rest were glad to
talk, some listened, and I believe voted
for Jackson and a local Black candidate.'
Law students at the University of
Virginia went door-to-door in Charlottesville, and students and faculty of
James Madison College in Harrisonburg, Va . In both places, whites came
out to caucuses for Jackson. Southern
Baptist Seminary students did similar
work in Louisville.
In Nashville, white and Black Jackson workers did voter registration
wearing Jackson T-shirts and buttons
in white and mixed communities. They
carried predominantly white precincts.
Janet Wolf, white Tennessee Hunger
Coalition activist, said: "Whenever we
had time to talk about the issues, we
got white votes."
It can be done, and this is our challenge for the future. Blacks in this
country have always generated our
movements toward social change; but
sheer numbers dictate that we must
mobilize white America to follow that
leadership in order to build a movement strong enough to change the nation's priorities from death to life.
Jesse Jackson has opened the door
to such coalition-building. I've heard
some whites say they didn't know how
to work in the Jackson campaign because they didn't feel welcome. I don't
understand that, unless they were looking for an engraved invitation or redcarpet treatment. There may be ex-
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ceptions, but I don't know of a place in
the South - and perhaps not in the nation - where any white who really
wanted to work to get white votes
could not have become a part of this
campaign.
Blacks wanted the Rainbow. This
was dramatically demonstrated in my
community, where I became the beneficiary by being elected a delegate (and
then because of gender-balance problems an alternate) to the Democratic
National Convention. I told friends in
San Francisco I was there as a product
of ''affirmative action and a quota
system.'' The predominantly Black
caucus in our congressional district had
voted unanimously to give one of the
three delegates slots they had won for
Jackson to a white. This was a momentous decision: they gave up one of three
precious seats because of belief in that
dream, which is still all it is, of the
Rainbow.
This also happened in Lexington,
Ky., and some other places, where the
predominantly Black congressional
district caucus elected a delegation of
two Blacks and one white.
The vision is there, the door is open.
The next move is up to us who are
white.
Anne Braden is co-chair of the
Southern Organizing Committee for
Economic and Social Justice (SOC)

Some Recent Gra·nts
Central America Research Institute,
PO Box 4797, Berkeley, CA 94704.
This group formed in 1981 under
the name of the U .S.-El Salvador
Research and Information Center.
Their original purpose was to provide
information to the U.S. public on the
conflict in El Salvador and the U.S.
role in that conflict. Their work has
expanded to include all of Central
America and the U.S. role in the conflicts in El Salvador, Guatemala,
Nicaragua and continued presence in
Honduras. In addition to services
they provide activists in the Bay area,
the Institute publishes a monthly entitled Central America Bulletin which
is the only monthly publication in the
U.S. which exclusively covers events
in Central America. Some recent
topics in the Bulletin were: the
Catholic church in El Salvador, the
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military in Guatemala, and the U.S.
churches in Central America. Resist's
grant was used for a subscription
mailing. Subscriptions to the Bulletin
are available for $15/year from the
above address.
Women for Women in Lebanon, PO
Box 9, Porter Square Station, Cambridge, MA 02140.
Women for Women is a Boston
based group of Middle Eastern and
North American women who originally came together in response to the
1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.
This group sites two purposes for its
work: to raise money to support income generating women's projects in
South Lebanon and to provide information to the public about women's
lives in Lebanon and the rest of the
Arab world. Events sponsored by
Women for Women include film
screenings, workshops, cultural
events, study discussion about the
Middle East, and art exhibits. They
also set up literature tables at Boston
area events. Recently they started
work on a slide show about Middle
Eastern women's lives. Resist's grant
helped Women for Women purchase
a slide projector to use for production and for showings.
Arkansas Civil Liberties Union, PO
Box 2832, Little Rock, AR 72203.
Faced with combatting a wellfinanced right wing anti-abortion effort in the Arkansas state legislature,
the ACLU approached Resist for funding. At the time they had several
grants pending with other progressive
foundations but immediate financing
was necessary if their effort to combat the anti-choice campaign was to
have any success. Resist's grant
helped them produce important pamphlets and flyers.
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